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Multiple Identities: Touchstones
in Terrorism, Democratic Institutions, and the Rule of Law
Mary Frances Lebamoff
Abstract. This paper explores the underlying, foundational politico-social theories and
themes that relate closely to radicalization, terrorism, democracy and the rule of law.
It examines factors (touchstones) critical to these areas (political violence, terrorism,
rule of law and democracy, along with democratic institutions). Some of these
touchstones include the ‘lenses’ of identities, tribalism, and contrasts between
identities, including cultural, linguistic, socialization and civilizational aspects.
Keywords. Identity, multiple identities, amoral familism, ethnicity, ethnic identity,
civic identity, political identity/identity politics, national identity, political tribes,
religious and sectarian affiliations

Introduction
Identity is a potent force in today’s world, much as it has been in the past. One need
only consider recent events in Spain and the identities that some claim — Catalan or
Basque — that set individuals and groups who hold those identities as crucial against
or apart from the state itself. Consider, too, countries in Eastern Europe like Bosnia,
Macedonia and Kosovo. Identity, with its potentially many characteristics, is often
shaped by social organizations. Examples of such identities and social organizations
include age, religion, social class or caste, culture, dialect, disability, education,
ethnicity, language, nationality, sex, gender identity, generation, occupation,
profession, race, political party affiliation, sexual orientation, settlement, urban and
rural environments, and veteran status. Yet not all members of a given group are
involved in identity politics. Identity politics are frequently used by minority and civil
rights organizations to form a coalition with or against members of the majority.
One person may hold several of these identities, and therefore have multiple identities.
Awareness and understanding of multiple identities are crucial when objectively
considering aspects of an individual, of groups, political activity, and propensity for or
against violence or illicit activities such as smuggling or money-laundering, to name a
few traits that may be reviewed or researched. Some are socially determined; others
are determined communally or are civilizational. One may be, in a manner of speaking,
“born into” specific identities related to ethnicity or religious beliefs, or those important
to family and familial ties. Some personal identities are associated with cultural or
linguistic characteristics. Indeed, throughout time, people have held (and sometimes
juggled) multiple identities.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019
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An example might be a person who is simultaneously female, a mother, an aunt or
grandmother, a wife and later a widow, an educator, a business owner, a Native
American, and a marketer. Which identities rise to the fore is based on civilization,
socialization, environment, cultures, situations and circumstances, along with the need
to reconcile potential and actual facets of the various identities a person holds.
Kwame Anthony Appiah wrote cogently of multiple identities, “Identities are complex
and multiple and grow out of a history of changing responses to economic, political,
and cultural forces, almost always in opposition to other identities.”1
Identity politics and nationalism have become much-researched areas in recent
decades; one only need think of the break-ups of the former Soviet Union and the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to recall how identity issues, especially those
associated with nationalism, came to the fore. Turkey, too, has strong and very serious
nationalist movements at present, as do Poland and Hungary. All three of these latter
countries are seeing significant erosion of checks and balances, democratic institutions
(especially the judiciary), and a measurable move to the right politically.
Identity politics in political organizing is usually closely connected to the concepts of
deprivation, repression and oppression of one or more minorities in a state—or, in
response to those minorities, the organization of a countervailing identity political
effort by the majority to maintain their political power.2
Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural
society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the
development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks and
accommodative elements can lead to tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society,
economic prosperity, and stable and equitable institutions, or they can lead to violent
and other levels of conflict and tensions, economic displacement and upheaval,
institutional fragility and inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access,
justice and additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between ethnicities.
These frameworks (constitutional and through other means) become particularly
critical in a new state, particularly one in which there are known ethnic and even
civilizational clefts, such as the Republic of Macedonia (which I will examine as a
case), and even more so when ethno-religious fragmentation is pervasive.

Kwame Anthony Appiah. In My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture. Oxford
University Press, London, 1993.
2
“Identity Politics”, at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-politics/, Stanford University,
California, 2016 (revised).
1
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Huntington argues, in his “Clash of Civilizations” (1993), that major, ongoing conflicts
will occur in various areas of the world because of clashing cultural and religious
identities between groups, and that Islamic extremism would become the most
threatening movement to world peace and order. Eastern Europe is one of the areas on
a highly significant “cultural fault-line” or cleft between major civilizations (the
uppermost level of culture). In the case of Eastern Europe, the two civilizations that
come up against one another in that cleft are generally the Orthodox (Christian) and the
Islamic ones. 3 Huntington’s physical divisions of the various civilizations also indicate
that Western civilization has a place in Eastern Europe.
In post-modern discussions, the importance of democracy in developing and
determining structures, policies, and laws in states with multi-cultural, multipleidentity citizenry cannot be overstated. Democracy has become equivalent to
specifying “majority rule” and was originally linked with “tolerance” by Pericles in
430 BCE. Democracy today no longer means “direct rule” by the people, but instead,
usually representative democracy, where representatives are elected by the citizens to
whom they are answerable at least at the next election. Power rests in the hands of the
people who may elect official representatives to rule directly or indirectly. Today, too,
tolerance and establishment of various rights are sometimes viewed as preconditions to
democracy but “not as constitutive of democracy itself.”4 That all “democracies” are
not created equal nor do they include the constitutive elements of democracy is evident,
too: “democratic” in a country’s name does not indicate it is indeed a true democracy
or anything even resembling a democracy — take the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), or the People’s
Democratic Republic of Algeria, as examples.
There are many variations of democracy: direct and representative democracy;
presidential and parliamentary democracy; authoritarian and participatory democracy;
Islamic and social democracy.5 One often hears about liberal and illiberal democracy,
too. Most democracies, however, are basically majoritarian — that is, decisions are
made in line with majority rule. Those who hold leadership positions have, in most
cases under majoritarian democracy, been elected by the people they are to represent,
although there are also indirect ways of attaining leadership (appointments to
committees, affiliation with others who hold a similar mindset on particular issues, and
the like).

3

Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order Simon &
Schuster, New York, 1998.
4
Iain McLean and A. McMillan. Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003, 140-141.
5
Vaishnavi Patil, “What are the different types of democracy?” at http://sciabc.us/iPAD8.

Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 2019

3

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 80 [2019], No. 80, Art. 5

Comparative Civilizations Review

53

This can lead to what Amy Chua terms “political tribes” in certain cases and is closely
tied to “identity politics”.6
Conflict and Ethnic Conflict
Conflict emphasizes struggle and collision. Donald L. Horowitz’s definition is typical:
“Conflict is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to
neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals.”7 Add this to Stefan Wolff’s ethnic conflict
specifications, and the complexities are apparent: “…that in which the goals of at least
one conflict party are defined in [exclusively] ethnic terms, and in which the primary
fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic distinctions.” While it does not occur in
every society, in some, ethnic difference or cleavages can lead to frustration and
violence when “ethnic groups are forced to integrate into the national culture of the
state in which they find themselves.”
Ethnic conflicts may fall into one of three categories: group-state conflicts between the
minority and the institutions of the host state; inter-group conflicts, pitting the minority
against the host-nation or the majority; and between different ethnic groups
(sometimes, but not always, minority versus minority). There may be elements of
simultaneity in the types of conflicts. These categories tend to hold true no matter if
the geographic location is the Balkans, African states, North or Latin America, Western
Europe or Asia.
Harff and Gurr define ethnic groups as “psychological communities” whose members
hold a persistent sense of common interest and identity based on shared historical
experiences and valued cultural traits. These may include language, beliefs, lifestyles,
institutions, and a common homeland or established physical living space. 8 The
authors assert that the “ethnic groups whose status is of greatest concern…are those
that are the target of discrimination and that have organized to take political action to
promote or defend their interests.”9 Since they have already opened themselves to
being activists, it can be a relatively short step to considering violence, especially if
more peaceful forms of activism do not appear successful or do not meet group
demands/expectations.
6

Amy Chua. Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations. New York: Penguin Press,
2018; World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Instability. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).
7
Donald L. Horowitz. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. 2nd ed. (Los Angeles: University of California Press
1985), 95.
8
Benedict Anderson discusses “imagined communities”, a closely related concept to ethnicity and
ethnic groups, in his seminal work, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of
Nationalism Rev. Ed. New York and London: Verso Books, 1991. It follows that if communities can be
imagined, they can also be re-imagined, an important concept for this paper.
9
Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. 2nd Ed. Boulder CO: Westview
Press, 2004, 3.
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One of the factors can be thought of as a “touchstone” for varieties of political activism
helps explain why specific groups do become politically active: relative deprivation.
This theory was developed in the 1960s to examine and analyze situations in which
individuals or groups subjectively perceive themselves to be in an unfair (even unjust)
status or condition compared to their “advantaged” reference groups who have similar
attributes; therefore, they are deserving of similar rewards but are not receiving them.
Subjective experiences and interpretations of deprivation are more likely when the
differences between two groups shrink so that comparisons can be made fairly easily.
The discontent arising from relative deprivation has been used to explain radical
politics (whether of the left or the right), some religions, the rise of social movements,
industrial disputes, and crime. “The usual distinction made is that religious fervor or
demands for political change are a collective response to relative deprivation whereas
crime is an individualized response. But this is certainly not true of many crimes - for
example, smuggling, poaching or terrorism — which have a collective nature and a
communal base…”10
Relative deprivation theory may, in other words, assist in explaining some actions of
specific “discontented” groups, but not all. This is especially true when there are valid
and available pathways in a democratic system by which a “deprived” group or person
may register discontents and hopefully receive relief. If a specific group feels that they
have no practical, meaningful way to approach a state’s institutions or its
representatives, the situation will undoubtedly become more difficult to resolve.
But the signs and language of relative deprivation can be useful, especially in a
democracy with free speech and rule of law, in identifying and assessing groups or
persons at risk of becoming involved in criminal activities, such as terrorism, human
trafficking, organized crime, money-laundering, and interethnic conflict or violence, to
name a few of the risk areas. Not all persons who have a sense of relative deprivation
will be activists or, more significantly, will become radicalized as part of their claimed
identities. Nor does this indicate whether a person will engage in political violence or
its cousin, terrorism.11 The point here is that when persons believe themselves to be
disadvantaged for reasons of their identities, or because they may apparently lack an
identity others value, such as citizenship beliefs and ties to the state, crisis points can
more easily arise.

10

Jock Young, The Exclusive Society. Thousand Oaks CA: Sage Publishing, 1999, and at
http://www.malcolmread.com/JockYoung/relative.htm.
11
John Alan Cohan, “Necessity, Political Violence and Terrorism”, Stetson Law Review 35, 904-981
(2006).
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Another theory, that of the “good vs. bad neighborhood”, also offers some explanatory
and guiding power regarding conflict: if a state is in a “good” neighborhood, one that
is stable, friendly, and with citizens who are like those in other nearby states, conflict
is less likely internally or with other states. If one instead has “bad neighbors” (is
located in a bad neighborhood, in other words), not only is inter-state conflict likely,
but other types of instability will also be present (economic, employment, sectarian,
and so on). Intra-state conflict is also more probable. The state which may be rather
good but finds itself in a bad neighborhood because of changes in the surrounding states
or regimes is also more likely to engage in “bad” behavior both internally and in its
interstate relations.12
Another danger has recently arisen, the decline in democracies: fully one-third of the
world’s population lives in a “back-sliding democracy”, one in which authoritarian
traits are on the rise and have already had an impact. Even the U.S. is in this group.13
This decline is a worrisome trend, especially as newer states attempt to consolidate
democracy, democratic institutions, the rule of law, and to battle corruption.
Identities and the State
Determining political, legal and institutional frameworks for addressing a multicultural
civil society, and accommodating its multiple, diverse characteristics are critical for the
development and prosperity of a state and its members. These frameworks, especially
democracy and the rule of law, with other accommodative elements, can lead to
tolerance, a secure and inclusive civil society, general economic prosperity, and stable
and equitable institutions — or they can lead to violent and other damaging levels of
conflict, economic displacement and upheaval, institutional fragility and
inconsistencies, and quarrels over inclusion, system access, corruption, justice and
additional aspects of civil societal insecurity between groups (ethnicities in particular).
The constitutional framework and other practices, policies or programs become
particularly critical in a new state, especially in one in which there are identified, known
ethnic cleavages, and even more so when specific ethno-religious fragmentation is
pervasive.

12

Myron S. Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee
Flows", International Security 21, 1 (Summer 1996), pp. 37-38; see also the important research of
Michael Edward Brown in this area regarding proximate causes and underlying causes that may lead to
conflict.
13
“Democracy for All? V-DEM Democracy Report 2018”, University of Gothenburg, at
https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/vdem_democracy_report_2018.pdf.
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Using Harff and Gurr’s typology of politically active ethnic groups (ethnonationalists,
indigenous peoples, ethnoclasses and communal contenders), one may classify, as they
do, the ethnic tensions situation in Macedonia, for example, as ethnonationalist, driven
by the minority ethnicity’s aspiration to establish an independent state, or to be
autonomous (in varying degrees) from the present ruling state. Some ethnicities may
also wish closer ties with a national homeland outside of the one they currently live in.
These traits are generally true of Albanians in Macedonia.14
Again, Amy Chua’s “political tribalism” working theory may be of use: individuals of
a particular group gather together, shunning those who are not considered “like them”,
to engage in political actions and activities aimed at achieving the group’s goals. 15
There are those applying this theory even to current events in the United States, which
should come as no surprise. Political tribalism is closely related to amoral familism as
Edward Banfield explained it in the mid-1950s after a close case study of a northern
Italian community.16 It has been applied more to social and economic endeavors than
to wholly political ones. There are those who argue that today’s Kosovo resembles the
Italian community that Banfield examined in his case study. What both amoral
familism and political tribalism have most strongly in common is their foundational
belief that if it is good for the family (tribe), then it is good. Full stop. No further
moral, ethical, or other examination need occur.17 Some might also argue that this
conclusion helps to explain mafias and some criminal organizations.
The Rule of Law
Law enforcement and intelligence agencies (and other relevant institutions and
organizations), both national and international, know all of this, of course. It is when
trust erodes in an institution or its practices that serious problems can arise in society
and the institutions which are tasked with supporting that society.
The rule of law is based on four cornerstones:
1. Accountability: the government as well as private actors are accountable under
the law;

Ibid. 19. “Macedonia” is used throughout this paper for purposes of simplicity and because of
majority formal international recognition of the Republic under its constitutional name, including the
United States’ recognition.
15
Amy Chua. Political Tribes: Group Instincts and the Fate of Nations. New York: Penguin Press,
2018; World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global
Instability. New York: Random House LLC, 2003 (revised 2004).
16
Edward C. Banfield. Moral Bases of Backward Societies. Chicago: Free Press (University of
Chicago), 1955; revised and republished 1967.
17
Agron Demi. “The Society of Amoral Familism”. 22 Feb 2017 accessed at
https://prishtinainsight.com/society-amoral-familism/ on 21 March 2018.
14
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2. Just Laws: laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and
protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property and
certain core human rights;
3. Open Government: processes by which the laws are enacted, administered,
and enforced are accessible, fair, and efficient; and
4. Accessible and Impartial Dispute Resolution: Justice is delivered timely by
competent, ethical, and independent representatives and by neutrals who are
accessible, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities
they serve.18
There are other critical areas to the rule of law that arise from these four bases, and that
also may be affected by multiple identities: the World Justice Project (WJP) utilizes
these additional traits in its annual assessment and surveys. These nine additional traits
are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Constraints on Government Powers;
Absence of Corruption;
Open Government;
Fundamental Rights;
Order and Security;
Regulatory Enforcement;
Civil Justice;
Criminal Justice; and
Informal Justice.19

WJP’s survey for 2017-2018 placed Macedonia at 0.53, or in a weaker status, on par
with Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia. All these states ranked better
than Turkey, and just slightly behind Greece regionally. Macedonia, however, is
trending downward as of the most recent data, along with Bulgaria, not a positive sign
for the rule of law in these states. Deeper dives into the data on Rule of Law as part of
the World Justice Project’s surveys are available at http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/,
with an interactive map of the world and the results. They are quite enlightening.
The Rule of Law is one of the facets of democracy and good governance that creates
and permits “space” for political activities and activism. Under positive Rule of Law,
that space is orderly and transparent; if Rule of Law breaks down, that space becomes
more risk-filled, radicalized, and usually but not always more violent and less
democratic.

18
19

https://worldjusticeproject.org/about-us/overview/what-rule-law
https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index
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Democracy and Democratic Institutions
It is important to remember that, when examining Eastern European states, they are
nascent democracies – none even 50 years old yet, and several are not yet three decades
old (this includes Macedonia). One cannot expect these states to have mature
democratic institutions, much less the established and balanced Rule of Law and
consistency that more mature democracies often have (although sometimes not
constantly; much depends on the type of democracy and regime, as previously noted).
Add to youthfulness the fact that there is a history of corruption in most of these
countries that continues even today, and it is easier to understand why these newer
states face issues that at least some older states have largely overcome. Lack of trust
exacerbates the challenges in Eastern Europe — between countries and within each of
them. Political tribalism adds to the complexities, without a doubt, especially in states
with distinctive (often historical) ethnic rivalries.
Tribalism has two faces: it is inclusive for those in the defined group (that definition
usually developed and created by its members); it is also exclusive to those outside of
the defined group. Some have ethnonationalist traits and bases (even in the United
States). Some political tribalism is zero-sum (that is, anything lost from one group is
gained in total by the other). What one group or “tribe” (ethnic or ethnoreligious group,
in many cases) gains, the opposing group or other(s) lose.20
The trust issue is a major one in infant democracies (and even in older ones),
particularly if any incidents occur that affect minority groups, and even more
specifically, if those impact a “majority-minority” (that is, a group holding a high
percentage of the minority populace. The Albanian-Macedonians are such a group in
Macedonia, for example, at roughly around 25-30% of the state’s total population).21

20

See Thomas Schelling. The Strategy of Conflict. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1990;
also, Robert Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 2006; and Ken Binmore.
Game Theory and the Social Contract: Playing Fair (Vol I). Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1994. These
are all classics in the field of game theory. See also Chua, 2018.
21
Jens Reuter. 1993. “Policy and Economy in Macedonia,” in The Macedonian Question, ed. James
Pettifer (NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 28-38. The percentage is an estimate, as Albanian-Macedonians
have not taken part in any national censuses to date. Explanations for their boycott vary. Ethnic
Albanians boycotted the 1991 census as a protest against the government’s census: forms were not
printed in Albanian. The results of the 1994 Census are also formally disputed by ethnic Albanians,
particularly by ethnic Albanian political party leaders. See Reuter, and P.H. Liotta and Cindy R. Jebb,
Mapping Macedonia: Idea and Identity (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 66 and passim. Therefore, the
2002 census was similarly indeterminate for Albanian-Macedonians. The actual population percent of
ethnic Albanians and ethnic Macedonians is a commonly raised issue by partisan political leaders from
both ethnicities.
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There have been many such incidents in Macedonia involving Albanian-Macedonians,
unfortunately; one need only review issues of the Balkan Investigative Reporting
Network (BIRN, at birn.eu.com, is a “network of local non-governmental organizations
promoting freedom of speech, human rights and democratic values.”)22 They focus on
recent past and current reports from the Balkans. As a further example, BosniaHerzegovina has no actual majority, although Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) are
believed to comprise about 48% of the country’s population prior to the wars there.23
In Macedonia, Albanian-Macedonians are currently working with ethnic Macedonians
and the government under the terms of the Ohrid Framework Agreement 2001. It was
negotiated mostly by the international community (externally, in other words). This
technically did not and does not augur well for it; historically, externally developed
agreements, such as this one, do not hold up over time. Consider the very fragile
Dayton Accords or the Good Friday/Belfast agreements as examples of difficult,
externally designed agreements that are at risk.
If one accepts that it is unlikely these demographics are likely to change in any
statistically significant fashion, this means that democratic institutions must be highly
transparent and consistent in the manners in which they address their citizens’ issues,
and free from corruption if they wish to gain their populace’s trust, no matter which
ethnicity or other tribal group or affiliation any person claims.
Some even have sectarian aspects (again, see Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations).
This is certainly the case in Serbia, Republika Srpska, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo,
Macedonia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Croatia, Poland, and other
countries. Finding common ground and building consensus among the various political
parties and other activists are often viewed as next to impossible; this makes liberal
democracy and a stable, balanced and respected Rule of Law even more difficult to
instill. When powerful nationalist, sectarian or populist sentiments are included in the
variables that must be addressed in these endeavors, the chances of formulating and
holding together a liberal democracy with a solid and transparent rule of law look
somewhat bleak, to say the least. Recent rises in nationalism and populism, as
mentioned, have placed several Eastern and Central European countries at significant
risk.
Sectarianism is a well-determined touchstone for terrorism: this applies both to
terrorism occurring within a state and those who act as “foreign fighters” (seen most
recently in ISIS, the Islamic State in Syria).

22
23

www.birn.eu.com (Homepage note).
“Ethnic composition of Bosnia & Herzegovina 1991,” at Pop-stat.mashke.org.
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Because nationalist and/or sectarian sentiments do not necessarily stop at a state’s
border, there are transnational and diaspora aspects included in this. There are also
important issues that arise when such foreign fighters return to their home state after
involvement elsewhere. How can they be reintegrated into their home country and
society — and some ask if they even should be.
Banking systems associated with certain religious groups may make money laundering
more direct. Hawala or hewala is a much-used, informal funding transfer system based
not on the movement of cash, or wire transfers between banks, but instead on the
performance, confidentiality, and honor of a huge network of Islamic money handlers
(brokers). It is often used worldwide by those sending remittances back to a “home
country”, or to other individuals or organizations, including, it is suspected, terrorist
groups. One of the pillars of Islam, zakat, also specifies that charitable giving, in some
cases, may be appropriately used to fund fighters for Islamic goals and purposes.24 So
assets could be transferred to terrorists by the mosque. Add these factors to tightly knit
ethnic groups and kin groups, and the challenge of shutting down terrorism and its
resources, along with other forms of political activism, increases exponentially.
Understanding the causes, dynamics and progression of conflicts, particularly violent
ones which border on actual terrorism, and the potential forms of resolution are key
points in a move toward such resolution with a goal of attaining societal security. In a
democracy, whether relatively new or more mature, one approach is to consider the
various identities the parties hold who are involved in such tensions, and to attempt to
sort through which tensions are associated with which identities. Which are most likely
to have been or to become politicized? Where will support for the contending group
come from? Potentially, it could arise from organized crime, mafia-type criminal
“families”, money-laundering, the diaspora community, religiously affiliated
organizations and entities, traditional and new smuggling operations, and so on.
Conflict is broad-ranging and far-reaching, in most cases. It need not take place on the
parties’ doorsteps. Indeed, much of terrorism takes place away from the fighters’
homelands. That such action occurs makes the return and reintegration of those who
have been involved in foreign conflicts even more crucial if peace, positive or negative,
is to be maintained on the “home front”. If one’s identity as a terrorist, together with
the associated ideologies and belief sets, is ascendant, reintegration may not be possible
or desirable. In that case, the justice system and its democratic institutions must step
in to handle these cases.

William A. Gawthrop. 2010. “Zakat: A Warfare Funding Mechanism”, at
http://micastore.com/Vanguard/
PastIssues/2010April.pdf.
24
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Handling Conflicts: Management, Settlement, Resolution and Consolidation
Albert Einstein’s definition of peace may be useful in this respect: “Peace is not merely
the absence of war but the presence of justice, of law, of order — in short, of
government.”
Important to positive peace then are aspects of interethnic tolerance or harmony, and
positive attitudes such as generosity, tolerance or inclusion of minorities by the
majority group. Control of violence matters and is often achieved by dissociation
(conflicting parties are separated, whether by their own efforts or through governmental
or military efforts). In general, policies based on negative peace (the absence of
war/conflict) rather than positive peace do not deal with the underlying causes of
violence, only its manifestations. Negative peace efforts may actually lead to future
escalation of violence rather than a lasting peace, since tensions from social conflict
are merely repressed rather than fully resolved.25
Conflict management and associated regulation are attempts to “contain, limit, or direct
the effects of an ongoing ethnic conflict on the wider society in which it takes place.”
This can be a society/location, as indicated, far from one’s home state. Conflict
settlement’s goal is to implement “an institutional framework in which the conflicting
interests of different ethnic groups can be accommodated [so]…that incentives for
cooperation and non-violent pursuit of conflicts…through compromise outweigh any
benefits that might be expected from violent confrontation.” 26
Conflict resolution demands identification of causal factors fundamental to the conflict
and developing means to address them effectively. This infers, in turn, that attitudes
and behavior that view violence as an acceptable means to address difference must be
changed, that systems and structures may require alteration to be responsive and
adaptive to ethnicities within a state, and furthermore, the recognition that conflict
resolution is both a process and the process’s terminal result.
The negotiation process determines outcome (management, settlement or resolution),
whether the real causes are recognized and considered by the negotiators, or whether
they are deflected or avoided because discussing them is too high-risk. Consolidation
of the conflict management’s terms may occur at the same time, or later.
D.C. Woolman, “Education and Peace in the Thought of Johan Galtung,” Currents: Issues in
Education and Human Development Education and Peace 3, no. 2 (Spring 1985), 7-20. Quoted in
Sandy and Perkins, Jr., 3-4. See also Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and
War,” Foreign Affairs 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995), reprinted in Conflict after the Cold War: Arguments
on Causes of War and Peace 2nd ed., Richard K. Betts, ed. (NY: Pearson Longman, 2005), 318-30.
26
Stefan Wolff, “Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts,” in Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts:
Perspectives on Successes and Failures in Europe, Africa and Asia, eds. Ulrich Schneckener and
Stefan Wolff (NY: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 12.
25
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It also depends on attitudes toward violence among the conflicting groups. Continuing
to use Macedonia as an exemplar, consider that crucial to inter-ethnic violence
potential, the 2001 UNDP polls indicated 60% of Albanian-Macedonian male
respondents (ages 18-24) found violence an acceptable political approach.
In comparison, about 16.4% of Macedonian males in the same age group accepted
violence as a political practice.27 When one considers these factors [willingness to use
violence, high unemployment, pervasive mistrust of the Macedonian state (more
specifically, the Macedonian national police and other security and military forces),
civilizational cleavages, with limited education and economic prospects among
younger Albanian men in Macedonia)], it is little wonder Albanian paramilitaries and
other groups advocating political violence were perceived to be a credible option
(perhaps even an attractive one in some respects).28
From 1990 through 2001, conflict management efforts in Macedonia ranged from
unsuccessful integration attempts to various proposals for partition. With its symbolic
shift toward emphasis on ethnic Macedonians as the “titular nation” (a “hybrid mix of
the nation-state and state-nation concepts”)29, the 1991 Constitution intended to
integrate Macedonian citizens at the individual, not the group, level. Albanian
Macedonians found this “national minority” status unacceptable; as indicated, they
demanded constituent nation status as a group. In 2001, several members of the
Macedonian Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Prime Minister of Macedonia
advocated partition of the state along Macedonian-Albanian ethnic lines; the proposal
was abandoned due to open domestic and international disapproval of it. This issue
remains an open one legally, although attempts were (and are presently being) made by
various parties to resolve it. As a result, outbreaks of ethnic violence and preservation
of delicate inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia were addressed through a combination
of gradual concessions toward ethnic Albanians, the Ohrid Framework Agreement’s
terms, application of coercive means, and corrupt exchanges between ethnic elites.30

United Nations Development Programme, “Early warning report no. 4”, Feb/Mar 2001, accessed at
http://earlywarning.undp.sk/Reports/index.cfm?page=TeamReports&TeamID=5. Other early warning
reports sound similar and sometimes more extensive alarms.
28
Hislope, Robert, “Between a bad peace and a good war: insights and lessons from the almost war in
Macedonia,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 26, no. 1 (2004), 129-51.
29
Marko, 5.
30
Hislope, Robert. 1998. “Ethnic Conflict and the “Generosity Moment,” Journal of Democracy 9, no.
1 (1998), 140-153, at 145-46. See also Hislope, “Bad Peace, Good War,” 138-40.
27
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Corrupt exchange is, unfortunately, a signature trait of Macedonia’s ethnic conflict
management, since “between consent and force stands corruption/fraud (characteristic
of certain situations when it is hard to exercise the hegemonic function, and when the
use of force is too risky).”31 Corrupt exchange provides “incentives to ethnic party
elites to maintain coalition government despite the pressures that typically emanate
from intra-ethnic party competition and the general absence of political or value
consensus among coalition partners”.32
Short-term, government partners from all ethnic groups have an interest in maintaining
the coalition and staying in power since substantial material rewards are at stake.
While these are expected (and rational) outcomes of political participation in the
highest levels of government, corrupt elites in multi-ethnic coalitions further act to
“avoid interethnic confrontations; de-mobilizing elites thereby tone down their
nationalist rhetoric and adopt a more pragmatic approach upon taking office.”33
Macedonia’s government has not seen much in the way of interethnic conflict
avoidance and the like, given frequent (and ongoing) spates of verbal and physical
violence (in Parliament among elected officials, and elsewhere), at least some of which
is rooted in ethnicity, and nearly all of which has weakened inter-group trust,
democracy, rule of law and democratic institutionalization/institutions, while
strengthening corruption.34
In his research of corruption and its influence on inter-ethnic relations, Hislope dissects
the connection between corrupt exchange among ethnic elites and the stability of the
multi-ethnic coalitions governing Macedonia from 1992 until 2001.35 While corrupt
exchange helped hold together multi-ethnic coalitions until 2001, its consequences
were disastrous for institutions, democratic development, and for the rule of law. It is
no coincidence that the first clashes in 2001 between ethnic Albanian fighters and the
Macedonian national security forces occurred in villages left for years without the
presence of police or border patrols, thereby allowing safe haven for a variety of
smugglers and other lawbreakers who undermined societal security, civic affiliations
and identities. Accusations of internal security negligence and irregularities were
numerous.

Antonio Gramsci, in Robert Hislope, “When Being Bad is Good: Corrupt Exchange in Divided
Societies”, Conference Paper presented at Syracuse University, 2005 (unpublished), accessed on
February 14, 2017, at www.maxwell.syr.edu/moynihan/programs/ces/pcconfpdfs/Hislope.pdf, 1..
32
Hislope, “When Being Bad”, 3.
33
Hislope, “When Being Bad”, 3.
34
See reports on these incidents over the years at www.birn.eu.com. Refer also to various works in
Bibliography of this paper for further information.
35
See Hislope, “Calm Before the Storm? ...”, and “When Being Bad”.
31
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A former Minister of Interior of Macedonia, Pavle Trajanov, blames subsequent
Macedonian governments from the time of the “double embargo” in 1992 (by Greece
to its south and Serbia to its north) until at least the early to mid-2000s for organizing
or tolerating the smuggling of cigarettes, oil and a variety of arms from or through
Macedonia to Kosovo, Albania, and Serbia.36
Although the legal instruments of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement
should prevail and be fully implemented, the long practice of tolerating corruption
continues to take its toll on the institutions and peoples of Macedonia. A focused crossethnic battle against corruption must be waged, if Macedonia wishes to function under
the rule of law and democracy, with democratic institutions, to improve its economy
and meet the standards expected by its citizens and the international organizations such
as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) that the
country wishes to join.37
Developments after the 2001 armed conflict support the contention that this ethnic
conflict falls short of resolution, since the fundamental causes of the conflict have not
been obviated. This is not unexpected, since dealing with the underlying causes is the
most difficult aspect. Such a process requires strong domestic political will, the
consistent support of the international community, and a significant amount of time.
The cleavages from prior to and after 2001’s conflict must be attended to before
proceeding to the underlying causal factors, in order to achieve real conflict resolution
(rather than simply settlement) in Macedonia.
It is both probable and likely, as was discussed by other presenters at the NATO
Advanced Research Workshop in Skopje, Macedonia (April 11-14, 2018) that arms,
oil and other conflict-related materiel (especially small arms) are going to terrorist
groups in various global locations, and more particularly to the conflict-ridden Fertile
Crescent region which includes Syria, Jordan, Israel, a part of Egypt, southern Iraq, and
Saudi Arabia (it is sometimes called the Cradle of Civilization.)38 Some may also be
destined for Yemen and other Middle Eastern states and ethnic groups (such as the
Kurds), and the hands of ISIS and similar terrorist groups.

Center for the Study of Democracy, CSD Reports: “Cigarette Smuggling”,
http://www.csd.bg/publications/ book10/2.2.pdf; “Macedonia’s Public Secret: How Corruption Drags
the Country Down” (International Crisis Group Balkan Report no.133, 14 August 2002), 22-23,
accessed at http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/projects/balkans/macedonia/reports/
A400739_14082002.pdf; and Hislope, “When Being Bad is Good”, 34. Trajanov was Minister of
Interior, 1998-99.
37
Interview with V. Georgiev, Office of Prevention of Corruption, June 14, 2006, Skopje, Macedonia.
38
Mark, Joshua J. “Fertile Crescent”, 28 March 2018, in Ancient History Encyclopedia, at
https://www.ancient.eu/ Fertile_Crescent/.
36
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Remaining Issues for Conflict Settlement
In order to treat the unresolved underlying causes of ethnic conflict in Macedonia,
action is required to resolve structural and economic problems, as well as addressing
the factors of fear. Structural factors necessitating immediate attention are a broad and
effective battle against corruption and organized-crime, and deep, cross-cutting
reforms in the judiciary and public administration. A solution must be acceptable to
both sides in order to be sustainable and contribute to the stability and security of the
entire region. It is best if the proposed solutions are developed by the main parties to
them (the ethnic groups and their political representation).39
The importance of deep and significant reforms in the judiciary and public
administration sectors in Macedonia cannot be overstated and has been the subject of
much political posturing and publicity. Ensuring an efficient and professional
administration and judiciary, free from political machinations, is crucial for the rule of
law, non-discrimination and fight against corruption. It is also a necessary precondition
for improving the business climate and attracting foreign investment in Macedonia.
Only by taking such measures can Macedonia begin addressing the two major problems
for all citizens of the country regardless of their ethnicity: unemployment and poverty.40
The aid and assistance the international community has given Macedonia to undertake
reforms in these fields has been valuable over the past decade, but without strong
domestic political will and dedication to reforms that are often painful, not to mention
embarrassing, no significant or sustainable progress can be achieved.
Education is a crucial long-term investment in reconciliation and ethnic conflict
resolution. Macedonia's educational system must reinforce the positive values of
diversity, tolerance, and the cultural benefits of living in such a multi-cultural society.
The education system must provide students with the possibility for elective classes in
minority languages and, at the same time, should improve the quality of training in the
Macedonian language for students from other ethnic communities educated in a
primary language other than Macedonian.
It is important, not only for Macedonia but also for the entire Western Balkans region,
that the EU keeps commitments made as part of the 2003 Thessaloniki EU Council
regarding the future inclusion of the Western Balkan states as members.

Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism”, Comparative Politics, Vol. 13, No. 4 (July 1981), pp.
379-399; at stable URL https://www.jstor.org/stable/421717.
40
In the IRI Macedonia Survey, March 2006, http://macedonia.usaid.gov/, 52% of the citizens
responded that unemployment is the most serious problem facing Macedonia.
39

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol80/iss80/5

16

Lebamoff: Multiple Identities: Touchstones in Terrorism, Democratic Institu

66

Number 80, Spring 2019

If the EU elects to postpone the Euro-integrative processes for an extended period or
offers alternatives other than the prospect of EU membership, its conflict resolution
efforts in Macedonia and elsewhere in the Western Balkans will be undermined, since
its conditionality will not hold the same positive force as it has had. In such a situation,
radical forces likely would question whether “incentives for cooperation and the nonviolent pursuit of conflicts of interest through compromise outweigh any benefits that
might be expected from violent confrontation.”41
The focus on Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process and prospects supported
the country’s willingness to cooperate in the conflict resolution mechanisms proposed
by these international organizations and entities. In Macedonia, the struggle for
political stability and security, economic progress and democratic reform continues.
These issues are undoubtedly connected with successful ethnic conflict resolution and
once again point to the third side of Macedonia’s conflict resolution puzzle: Macedonia
cannot ignore the international community, especially EU and NATO. Only a serious
commitment from EU and NATO that includes the prospect of full membership in these
organizations at some realistic and specific future date will insulate Macedonia from
forthcoming risks and create a solid basis for the continuation of reforms needed to
fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, and to resolve, not simply settle or mask, the country’s
internal ethnic conflicts.
There is significant power in the Macedonian and Albanian diasporas. The stronger
the ties to an identity and a “homeland” among those diasporas, the more active their
membership tends to be. This can offer opportunities and/or barriers to cracking the
touchstones of terrorism and political violence
Furthermore, international actors have tended to underestimate the depth and
complexity of cleavages themselves within Macedonia. What may appear rational,
unambiguous, uncontroversial and logical to those outside Macedonia may face hurdles
not immediately evident to those not intimately involved in the socio-cultural, sociopolitical and socio-economic fabric of daily life in Macedonia. Integration is not
pervasive, nor is there necessarily a commitment to it across the board. Identity as an
exclusionary factor still defines much of life; that nearly all political parties are
ethnically based is a cogent example of this, as are continuing claims that there are
ethnic restrictions on where one may safely or comfortably live, be employed, travel
without harm, where security may be enforced, and the like. Progress has been made,
but more is needed, including stronger emphasis on civic identity and citizenship of a
state (inclusivity) versus ethnicity or other identity (exclusivity and cleavages).
Ted Robert Gurr, “Peoples against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System,”
International Studies Quarterly 38 (1994), 347-77; see also Peter Wallensteen and Margareta
Sollenberg, “Armed Conflict and Regional Conflict Complexes, 1989-97,” Journal of Peace Research
35:5 (1998), 621-34.
41
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